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PREPAID INCOME- THE ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING
SYSTEM AND THE TAX LAW
Scott Morris
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly thirty years have passed since the Supreme Court first ruled
that a taxpayer could not defer prepaid income over the years in
which it was earned.! Since that time, increasing complexity in busi-
ness organization has brought about an increased need for the de-
ferral practice, yet the laws controlling the use of this practice are
nearly the same today as they were years ago. Case after case has
confirmed the rule against deferral,' despite the fact that deferral
is, of necessity, an integral part of any accrual accounting system
dealing with prepaid income.
The accrual method recognizes items of income only when they
are "earned" in an accounting sense, regardless of the period in which
they are received by the taxpayer. To correlate items of income with
the expenses necessary to earn them, the accrual system dictates that
prepaid income be deferred over the period in which these expenses
are met.' However, the cases say that for taxation purposes such
deferral is prohibited.4 This conflict between the case law and the
practical needs of the taxpayer was well illustrated in a recent
Supreme Court case, Schlude v. Commissioner;' however, Schlude
established no new rules, nor can it be said that it actually extends
the rule against deferral of prepaid income into new areas. Unlike
the cases preceding it," however, Schlude" applies not to national
organizations or to special-interest groups, but denies the ordinary
businessman the deferral privilege, even though his accrual account-
ing system dictates that he defer prepaid income.
The purpose of this Comment is to explain the rationale behind
the rule against deferral, to illustrate why attempts to change the
'Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934).
'Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963); American Auto. Ass'n v. United
States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961); Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957);
Brown v. Helvering, supra note 1; South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 818
(5th Cir. 1943); Curtis R. Andrews, 23 T.C. 1026 (1955); Wallace A. Moritz, 21 T.C.
622 (1954); National Airlines, Inc., 9 T.C. 159 (1947); Your Health Club, Inc., 4 T.C.
385 (1944); South Tacoma Motor Co., 3 T.C. 411 (1943).
3 Miller, Tax Problems in Change of Accounting Methods, U. So. Cal. 9th Tax Inst.
354 (1957).
4 See note 2 supra.
5372 U.S. 128 (1963).
* American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961); Automobile Club v.
Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
7372 U.S. 128 (1963).
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rule have failed, and to suggest methods by 'which a taxpayer can, in
effect, defer prepaid income.
II. PREPAID INCOME AND THE CLAIM OF RIGHT DOCTRINE
A. Case History
For some time, accountants have disagreed with the courts over
the application of the claim of right doctrine to prepaid income!
North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet9 instituted the so-
called claim of right doctrine. In that case, the issue was in which
year the revenue from property, title to which was in litigation,
would be income for taxation purposes. The Court held that the in-
come was reportable in the year in which a final decree was entered
awarding title to the land to the taxpayer.10 A few years later, in
Brown v. Helvering,"1 the Court applied the claim of right doctrine
to earnings received from insurance policy premiums. Although the
general agent had unrestricted use of the money, he tried to deduct
the amount he put into a "return commissions" account which was
designed to meet contingent liabilities arising under the policies he
sold. The Court rejected this system and stated that the agent's right
to the money, when received, was absolute. The income was under
no restriction, contractual or otherwise, as to disposition, use, or
enjoyment." The most interesting aspect of the Brown case is the
Court's rejection of an alternative plan to defer prepaid income.
Petitioner claimed that the overriding commissions, which were sub-
ject to the contingency of being refunded to the company if the
policy was cancelled, were compensation for services rendered
throughout the life of the policy. Thus, petitioner claimed that he
should be allowed to prorate the commissions over the life of the
policies. The Court dismissed this proposal summarily, ruling that
the commissions were to be treated as income for the years in which
the policies were written."
South Dade Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner1" is recognized as the first
8 Simply stated, the doctrine is: When a taxpayer receives income under a claim of
right and without restrictions on the use of the money, this income must be reported
even though the money has not been earned in an accounting sense. Contrarily, the basic
tenet of accrual accounting is that income is not reported until earned, i.e., until the services
necessary to earn it have been rendered.
9286 U.S. 417 (1932).
0 Id. at 424.
" 291 U.S. 193 (1934).12 1d. at 199.
13 Id. at 203-04. Apparently, this was the first time that a plan for deferring prepaid
income had come before the Court. However, petitioner's plan was not brought up in the
lower courts and thus was not really in issue before the Supreme Court.
14138 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1943).
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case clearly applying the claim of right doctrine to prepaid income.
The court held that rental paid in advance on the lease of farm lands
was taxable in the year of receipt because "the taxpayer had unfettered
dominion and control over the use and disposition of the money."1
The taxpayer's accrual system, which deferred the rentals by prorat-
ing them over the period of the leases, was rejected. Despite the fact
that this system supposedly was the best indicator of net earnings,
the court decreed that the method of accounting was required to re-
flect income, not net earnings.
The Tax Court extended the claim of right doctrine to a number
of cases in which prepaid cash receipts for services to be rendered at
future times were not earned in an accounting sense. One case' held
that the entire amount received from the sale of coupon books, en-
titling the purchaser to subsequent automotive services, was report-
able income in the year the books were sold. Your Health Club, Inc."9
held that the accrual system taxpayer had to report income in the
year received, even though the services earning the income extended
beyond the year of receipt. In another case,' the court refused to let
an airline adopt an accrual system required by the Civil Aeronautics
Board because the C.A.B. system dictated deferring prepaid income.
Two later Tax Court cases firmly established that court's adherence
to the claim of right doctrine. Wallace A. Moritz"° held that an accru-
al basis taxpayer "is subject to tax liability when the right to receive
income becomes fixed."" In Curtis R. Andrews,2 an Arthur Murray
dance studio case similar to Schlude, the court was even more explicit:
Irrespective of the merits of generally accepted commercial accounting
treatment of prepaid income, it has been clearly established that, under
the 'claim of right' doctrine, prepaid income must be reported as in-
come in the year of receipt .... There was no restriction as to the use
or disposition of the prepaid receipts .... The 'claim of right' doctrine
is firmly established and must govern the result herein.2'
Although these Tax Court cases established the claim of right doc-
trine as the determinative factor in deciding when income is report-
able, the Supreme Court had not spoken on the subject of deferral
"Id. at 819.
"Ibid. The definition of income is money received under a claim of right.
17 South Tacoma Motor Co., 3 T.C. 411 (1944).
"4 T.C. 385 (1944).1"National Airlines, Inc., 9 T.C. 159 (1947).
2"21 T.C. 622 (1954).
21 Id. at 624.




since Brown v. Helvering.4 However, in 1957 the Court decided
Automobile Club v. Commissioner."5 The club sold one year member-
ships which were paid in advance. It credited dues to a liability ac-
count and allocated one-twelfth of the membership fee as income in
each month of the year-long membership period. Applying the claim
of right doctrine, the Court held that the dues were income in the
year received because the club had unrestricted use of the dues in
the year of receipt." As the allocation of the dues over the period of
the memberships bore no relation to the time when members called
on the club for services, the Court rejected the accrual system em-
ployed as not clearly reflecting income."
Four years later, the Court rendered a similar holding in American
Auto. Ass'n. " That decision accentuates the dichotomy between gen-
erally accepted principles of commercial accounting and tax account-
ing. In it, the Court stated, "[T]he method employed by the Associa-
tion is in accord with generally accepted accounting principles and
practice." However, this "is not to hold that for income tax purposes
it so clearly reflects income as to be binding on the Treasury.
29
B. Exceptions To The Claim Of Right Doctrine
In cases in which the taxpayer receives prepaid income for goods
rather than for services, the Tax Court has departed somewhat from
the claim of right doctrine. The exception was set out in Veenstra
& De Haan Coal Co.3" There the court held that prepaid receipts
(deposits insuring the future delivery of coal) were not taxable in
the year of receipt. Again, in Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co.,2 the
court ruled that payments received under executory contracts were
not completed sales; thus retention of the payments was too con-
tingent for them to be taxed as income in the year of receipt. Al-
though nearly all of the disagreement over the deferral privilege has
arisen from "service" contracts, taxpayers who receive prepaid income
for goods should note the above cases as establishing a precedent al-
lowing retention of the deferral practice.
Aside from simple deferrals in reporting income, the most popu-
lar method of allocating prepaid receipts to subsequent tax periods
24291 U.S. 193 (1934).
25353 U.S. 180 (1957).
26Id. at 189.
21d. at 189-190.
'2367 U.S. 687 (1961).
29 1d. at 693.
so li T.C. 964 (1948).
31 16 T.C. 1067 (1951).
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has been the creation of reserve accounts. These reserves are set up
to meet expenses incurred in earning the income in subsequent years
and are deducted from gross income in the year when the prepaid
amount is received. Some courts have allowed deduction of these re-
serve funds so long as there was a fixed liability on the taxpayer to
perform services in future periods."2 In all of these cases, the Tax Court
had invoked the claim of right doctrine and disallowed deduction of
the reserve funds. In each case, the courts of appeals overturned the
Tax Court on the premise that the taxpayer's method of accounting
clearly reflected income."3
The Supreme Court spoke on the subject of reserves in 1959 s" and
vindicated the claim of right theory somewhat. Several automobile
dealers included as income the amounts they received from the
finance companies that handled their conditional sales. The dealers
did not, however, report the percentage of the price that the finance
companies retained in a reserve fund until the automobiles were paid
out. The Court held that the amounts placed in these reserves were
accrued income to the dealers at the time of the credit. 5 "[I]t is the
time of acquisition of the fixed right to receive the reserves and not
the time of their actual receipt that determines whether or not the
reserves have accrued and are taxable."' Even so, this case can be
differentiated from those courts of appeals decisions which held the
claim of right doctrine inapplicable so long as the accounting system
employed "clearly reflects income." ' It should be noted that Hansen
concerned a reserve in another party's hands, a sum of money that
was to be paid to the taxpayer despite the fact that he had no addi-
tional duties to perform to earn the money. The earlier cases con-
cerned reserve funds which the taxpayers themselves set up to meet
the expenses necessary to earn their income."
" Deduction of a sales commissions reserve was allowed in Ohmer Register Co. v.
Commissioner, 131 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1942). One taxpayer was allowed to deduct
brokerage fees which were to be paid in a later period and to deduct the estimated cost
of preparing goods for shipment. Pacific Grapes Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d
862 (9th Cir. 1955). An appliance dealer was allowed to set up a reserve fund to cover
the costs of servicing furnaces purchased by its customers. Schuessler v. Commissioner,
230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956). More recently, deduction of a reserve set up for television
service contracts has been allowed. Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 520
(2d Cir. 1959). However, this holding is contradicted by another court's verdict in an
identical fact situation. Streight Radio & Television, Inc. v. Commissioner, 280 F.2d 883
(7th Cir. 1960).
3 Ibid.
3' Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959).
3s Id. at 464.
3 Ibid.




C. The Legislative History Of Prepaid Income
Judicial establishment of the claim of right doctrine as a bar to
deferring prepaid income led to the addition of sections 452 and 462
to the Internal Revenue Code. Fundamentally, this was the situa-
tion: Accountants and tax lawyers had long wanted to bring tax
accounting into harmony with accepted principles of business ac-
counting. Because the courts had ruled that prepaid income received
under a claim of right had to be reported in the year of receipt,
these accountants and lawyers went to Congress for relief. Repre-
sentatives of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
appeared before the House Ways and Means Committee and asked
for an amendment to the Code that would permit deferral."9 In 1953
Congress enacted sections 452 and 462, concerning prepaid receipts
and reserves for estimated expenses, respectively. Under section 452,
a taxpayer operating on the accrual method could defer reporting
prepaid income until the years in which it was earned. This income,
however, could not be deferred over a period longer than five years.'
Section 462 specifically allowed the deduction of reserves for esti-
mated future expenses of fulfilling contracts.4'
Although these two sections were generally acclaimed as at last
bringing about some correlation of tax accounting and commercial
accounting, they were repealed retroactively.4 In its report recom-
mending the repeal, the House Ways and Means Committee stated
that it firmly believed in resolving the differences between the two
accounting systems, but that an unforeseeably large revenue loss
would result from taxpayers' receiving double deductions in the first
year they reported under the new system."
From an accounting viewpoint, the repeal was unfortunate, for
section 452 had made it possible for the first time for a taxpayer to
defer reporting prepaid income. It is obvious that the repeal of section
452 was a return to the previous judicial policy of disallowing de-
39 Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means Regarding General Revenue
Revision, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 585 (1953).
4 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 452(a), 69 Stat. 134 (1955). Section 452(e)(1)
defined prepaid income as:
Any amount (includable in gross income) which is received in connection
with, and is directly attributable to, a liability which extends beyond the close
of the taxable year in which such amount is received. Such term does not
include any income treated as a gain from the sale or other disposition of a
capital asset.
' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 1, 5 462(a), 69 Stat. 134 (1955).4
2Act of June 15, 1955, ch. 143, 1 (a), 69 Stat. 134 (1955); Id. at § I(b).4 3 H.R. Rep. No. 293, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. 3, 4 (1955). The Treasury originally
estimated the loss at forty-seven million dollars. At the time he asked for the repeal,
Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey estimated the impending loss at one billion dollars.
[Vol. 17
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ferrals and that Congress regretted having to make this reversal.
The Senate Report, concurring with the House Report in recom-
mending the repeal, expressly stated that the repeal of sections 452
and 462 was not to be considered as either acceptance or rejection of
any judicial decisions on the matter. The report further explained that
the committee wanted to make the deferral privilege available gen-
erally and that they planned to devise proper substitutes for the re-
pealed sections."
Congress has restored in part the advantages of deferral which
were eliminated with the repeal of section 452. In 1957 Congress
added section 455 to the Code. This section allows publishers to re-
port prepaid subscription income in the years during which the
liability exists to deliver newspapers, magazines, and other periodi-
cals. 5 Later, Congress enacted section 456 to nullify the decisions in
the automobile club cases. This new section allows membership
organizations, such as automobile clubs, to defer reporting mem-
bership dues."
Despite its announced intention to reflect accepted commercial
accounting principles throughout the tax code, 7 Congress has not
yet extended the deferral privilege to taxpayers in general. In fact,
bills permitting deferral of prepaid income received under "service"
contracts have been introduced but defeated. 8 Consequently, an ordi-
nary taxpayer like Schlude, who cannot benefit from the special pro-
visions of sections 455 and 456, is left with the previous judicial
policy, which dictates that he may not defer prepaid income.
D. The Law Before Schlude v. Commissioner, A Summary.
Clearly, the claim of right doctrine has been firmly established in
the courts. That Congress sought to overturn the application of the
doctrine to prepaid income by enacting sections 452 and 462 was, in
itself, recognition of the doctrine. Despite Congress' tacit recognition
of the doctrine and despite the Supreme Court's adoption of the claim
of right doctrine, various writers and judges have protested that the
application of the doctrine in prepaid income cases is a perversion of
its proper use.' They argued that the doctrine is relevant only in
4S. Rep. No. 372, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. 5, 6 (1955).451Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 455.
46 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 456.
47S. Rep. No. 372, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 6 (1955). See text accompanying note 44
supra.
4H.R. 8688, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. 2245, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. (1961);
H.R. 2440, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
4' Beacon Pub. Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697, 700 (10th Cir. 1955); Behren,
Schlude: Rationale is Uncertain, 18 J. Taxation 194-95 (1963); Behren, Prepaid Income-
1963 ]
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determining whether receipts are reportable income, not in deter-
mining in which year it is reportable." This argument can be criti-
cized on the ground that it is a weak distinction to say that, for tax
purposes, amounts received under a legal claim of right are earned
although there may be some contingency as to their retention because
of a conflicting claim,"' but that prepaid income is not earned in the
tax sense if it is subject to a contingency as to its amount, based
upon an obligation to furnish future services.
To say that these sums have not been 'earned' in the accounting sense
merely begs the question of whether the accrual system of accounting
for tax purposes allows the deferral of such amounts. The taxpayer has
sold a contract for future services and received the price of that con-
tract. The receipt is not in the form of a deposit or trust fund, but is
instead the unfettered property of the taxpayer. Therefore, regardless
of accounting considerations it seems appropriate at that time for the
government to exact its tax."
Refusing to accept the long line of decisions adopting the claim
of right doctrine as establishing the correct rule, the critics of the
doctrine hoped for a case in which the Supreme Court might over-
turn the application of the doctrine to prepaid income cases. The
critics thought they had found such a case when Schlude v. Commis-
sioner" went to the Court.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF Schlude v. Commissioner
In Schlude v. Commissioner," the taxpayers operated a chain of
dancing studios which offered dancing lessons under two basic con-
tracts: a cash plan which required the entire down payment in cash
and a deferred payment plan which required only a portion of the
down payment to be paid in cash. In the latter plan, the student
gave the studio a negotiable note and paid it in installments. Both
contracts provided that: (1) the student was to pay a certain amount
of tuition, (2) he would not be relieved of his contract to pay tuition,
(3) no refunds would be made, and (4) the contract was non-
cancellable. Although the contracts designated the period during
which the lessons had to be taken, there was no schedule of specific
Accounting Concepts and the Tax Law, 15 Tax L. Rev. 343, 349 (1960); Horwich, Deferred
Income and Claim of Right, $ Tax Counseler's Q. 1 (1961).
50 Ibid.
" North American Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417, 464 (1932).
" Loeb, Cash Receipts and Accrual Method Taxpayers, the A.A.A. Case, U. So. Cal.
14th Tax Inst. 737, 757 (1962).




dates, and appointments were arranged from time to time as lessons
were given."
Cash payments and amounts received from discounting the nego-
tiable notes were deposited in the taxpayers' general bank account
without segregation from other funds." The studio kept its books
and reported income on an accrual system. It maintained a system
of individual record cards showing the number of hours taught each
student and the number of lessons remaining under the contract.
At the end of each fiscal year, the cards were analyzed and the in-
come earned from lessons given during the year was transferred from
the deferred income account and reported as earned income. Addi-
tionally, if a contract lay idle for a year or more or a course was re-
duced in amount, any gains were transferred to the earned income
account. After these transfers from the deferred income account
were made, the balance was carried over into the next fiscal year to
be handled as before. Expenses were reported on the accrual basis
except that royalty payments to Arthur Murray, Inc. and sales com-
missions were deducted when paid without regard to the period in
which the related receipts were taken into income."
The Commissioner rejected the accounting system as not clearly
reflecting income." He included as gross income not only advance
payments received in cash, but also the full face amounts of notes
and contracts executed during the years in question. The Tax Court
upheld the Commissioner," but the Eighth Circuit reversed.' Follow-
ing American Auto. Ass'n,0' the Supreme Court granted certiorari,'*
vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration.
On remand, the court of appeals held that, in view of American Auto.
Ass'n," the taxpayers' accounting system did not, for income tax
purposes, clearly reflect income."
On final review by the Supreme Court, the issue was: Should the
taxpayer be required to include advance payments in cash, the face
value of negotiable notes, and the value of contract installments fall-
ing due but remaining unpaid as income in a particular year? The
"Brief for Petitioner, pp. 3, 4, Schlude v. Commissioner, ibid.
5372 U.S. at 131.
"Brief for Petitioner, pp. 5-6; Brief for Respondent, p. 6, Schlude v. Commissioner,
372 U.S. 128 (1963).
" 372 U.S. at 133-34.
3932 T.C. 1271 (1959).
0283 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1960).
a'367 U.S. 687 (1961).
62367 U.S. 911 (1961).
63367 U.S. 687 (1961).
"296 F.2d 721 (8th Cit. 1961).
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Court, stating that the problem was squarely controlled by American
Auto. Ass'n,"5 held that the Commissioner acted properly."
The majority opinion states: (1) that the retroactive repeal of
section 452 of the 1954 Code reinstated longstanding administrative
and lower court rulings that the Commissioner could reject account-
ing systems deferring prepaid income; 7 (2) that the taxpayers'
accounting system did not clearly reflect income for taxation pur-
poses as required by section 41 of the 1939 Code and section 446 (b)
of the 1954 Code;"8 and (3) that for an accrual basis taxpayer, "it
is the right to receive not the actual receipt that determines the in-
clusion of the amount in gross income.""9 The minority makes its
strongest arguments on the first two bases-the repeal of section 452
and the "clear reflection of income" arguments'°-and dismisses as
inapplicable the claim of right doctrine, which is the third basis of the
majority opinion.71
In taking up the "clear reflection of income" argument, the dis-
sent debated the implications of the enactment and repeal of sections
452 and 462 of the Code." Mr. Justice Stewart reiterated the argument
he used in the dissent in American Auto. Ass'n." He refused to
divorce the deferral privilege from the other aspects of accrual
accounting, insisting "no inference of disapproval of accrual account-
ing principles was to be drawn from the repeal of the sections."74 The
majority, however, did not infer any disapproval of accrual account-
ing from the repeal of sections 452 and 462 save for Congress' man-
date that the deferral privilege no longer is allowed." The majority
opinion is, of course, substantiated by the reports of the various
Congressional committees.' The majority decision is strengthened
by Congress' cautious, step-by-step approach in restoring the deferral
privilege to limited groups of taxpayers while denying it, for the
time being at least, to taxpayers generally.7 Two new sections, sec-
6' 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
6'372 U.S. 128, 134 (1963).
671d. at 134-35.
6  Id. at 136.
6' Id. at 137. At this point, note the concession the Government made on a point it
had won in the lower courts. The Government conceded that a bare contractual promise
to pay is not includable in income unless the sum is due or the lessons contracted for
are given.
75ld. at 139, 141.
Id. at 137-38.
SId. at 139-40.
"03 67 U.S. at 703-11.
"4372 U.S. 128, 139-40 (1963).
75id. at 134.
76 See text accompanying notes 42, 44 supra.
7 See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text.
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tions 455 and 456, have granted the deferral privilege to publishers
and membership organizations, respectively. Yet, omnibus bills that
would have granted the privilege to all service industries have been
defeated.78
Despite the minority's dismissal of the claim of right doctrine, this
principle is as basic to Schlude v. Commissioner as it is to all prepaid
income cases. In the face of overwhelming evidence that the claim of
right doctrine determines when receipts are reportable income,79 the
minority retreats into a battle of semantics. Admitting, in a foot-
note, that the claim of right doctrine has "sometimes" been a bar to
deferrals, the minority cites two "more recent" cases as proof that
the doctrine is irrelevant to the deferral issue.8" The fallacy in the
argument is that these cases, Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner"5
and Schuessler v. Commissiozer," are reserves cases, not simple de-
ferral cases. As has been pointed out, the courts have, with one excep-
tion, been almost as lenient in allowing deductions of reserves as
they have been strict in disallowing simple deferrals."
Stating that the Code "explicitly authorizes income tax returns to
be based upon sound accrual methods," 4 the dissent does not consider
the command that all accounting systems must clearly reflect in-
come."5 The whole point is that, by the dictates of the claim of right
doctrine, prepaid receipts taken under a claim of right are income.
They must be reported in the year of their receipt if the taxpayer's
system clearly reflects income.8 Therefore, the decision in Schiude
ultimately turns upon whether the taxpayer's accounting system
"clearly reflects income. '87
78 See text accompanying note 48 supra,79Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934), held that money received under a
claim of right without restriction as to its use is reportable income. South Dade Farms,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1943), applied the doctrine to prepaid
income, and this precedent has been followed consistently by the Tax Court. See text
accompanying notes 17-23 sufpra. A Supreme Court case cited by the majority, Commissioner
v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959), clearly states that for an accrual system taxpayer "it is
the right to receive not the actual receipt that determines the inclusion of the amount in
gross income." Id. at 464.
S°Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128, 138 n.1 (1963).
" 267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959).
'2230 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1956).
83 See note 32 supra and accompanying text. Further, the validity of the exception,
Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 520 (2nd Cir. 1959), is challenged by
Streight Radio and Television, Inc. v. Commissioner, 280 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1960). The fact
situations in the two cases are identical; in Bressner, supra at 525, the Second Circuit held the
claim of right doctrine inapplicable and in Streight, supra at 887, the Seventh Circuit held
the doctrine applicable. Note also that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Streight, 366
U.S. 965 (1961), but no appeal was taken in Bressne,.
14372 U.S. at 139.
"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 446(b).
"American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 689 (1961).
87 372 U.S. at 136, 139-40.
1963 ]
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Whichever method is used, cash or accrual, the accounting system
must, if it clearly reflects income, compute taxable net income on
an annual basis. Neither income nor deductions may be accelerated
or postponed from one taxable year to another in an attempt to
reflect the long-term economic result of a particular transaction.
Ordinary accrual systems do not conflict with this principle, but the
deferral of prepaid income conflicts directly.
Failure clearly to reflect income for tax purposes was the basis for
rejecting the accounting systems in both Automobile Club89 and
American Auto. Ass'n.9° In the Automobile Club case, the Court said:
"The pro rata allocation of the membership dues in monthly amounts
is purely artificial and bears no relation to the services which petition-
er may in fact be called upon to render for the member." 9' In Ameri-
can Auto. Ass'n, the Court found that the A.A.A.'s system might
be in accord with generally accepted accounting principles and prac-
tice, but for income tax purposes it did not so clearly reflect income
as to be binding on the Treasury.
Applying the two automobile cases to Schlude, the Court held that
the taxpayers' accounting system was artificial because the prepaid
receipts related to services to be performed at an unfixed time." Even
if a student let his rights lapse by not demanding the lessons, the
studio still could demand that he make his payments.94 Under the
contracts, the studio had a right to retain both prepayments and in-
stallment payments without any restriction as to their use and with-
out any obligation to refund.9" Although the studio could determine
at the end of the year from the card system how many lessons it
had given during the year, still it could not determine how many,
if any, lessons it would have to give in the future. The studio could
compute income earned during the current and previous years, but
could not accurately anticipate earnings for future years.9 This was
true despite the fact that the taxpayers were paid in advance for
possible future services.
"SSecurity Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1944); Dixie
Pine Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 516, 519 (1944); Spring City Foundry Co. v.
Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 190 (1934); Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks, 282 U.S. 359,
364 (1930).
89353 U.S. 180 (1957).
" 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
9'353 U.S. at 189.
9' 367 U.S. at 693.




97372 U.S. at 130, 131-32.
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The Schludes' accounting system did not clearly reflect income be-
cause income and expenses were not correlated within the taxable year.
Instead, their system postponed income to subsequent years without
any relation to the expenses incurred in those years. Such postpone-
ments are in violation of the annual accounting rule." Mr. Justice
Stewart's objection to the majority opinion is that it strikes down an
accrual system that accurately reflects the taxpayers' earned income.
He is, however, forced to admit that the accounting system does not
correlate deferred, unearned income with the expenses that would
be necessary to earn it in later tax periods."
IV. CONCLUSION
Schlude exemplifies the distinction that courts must make between
ordinary commercial accounting and tax accounting. The require-
ments of tax accounting are designed for maintenance of government
revenue; commercial accounting practices are not so designed. The
two accounting systems must, therefore, conflict at some point.
Two of the basic theories of commercial accounting are (1) to
match income with the expenditures necessary to produce it and (2)
to defer recognition of income until such expenditures are made. By
delaying the recognition of income until it is earned, the accounting
system minimizes excessive and/or speculative income.
Taxing authorities are concerned with protecting the revenues,
not with the technicalities of when income is earned. Consequently,
the Treasury is interested in the fact that a citizen holds money
under a legal claim and that the money is taxable. The Treasury has
little concern that the money is not earned in a commercial account-
ing sense.' o In taxation problems, therefore, the claim of right doc-
trine often is the focal point because it defines reportable income.
That the Schludes had unrestricted use of their prepaid income
is undisputed; they held the money under a claim of right. Their
right to receive the money was not conditioned upon the giving of a
service or the delivery of goods; rather, it was fixed by the contract.
The accounting system they used did not correlate receipts with
expenditures,"' so it could not "clearly reflect" the income received
under the contracts. Section 446 of the Code provides both that tax-
able income is to be computed under the accounting system by which
the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books and
:8 See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
ooSchlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128, 141 (1963).
100 Loeb, supra note 52, at 756.
... Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128, 135-36 (1963).
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that "if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the compu-
tation of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the
opinion of the Secretary or his delegate, does clearly reflect income.' '..
So, actually the Code does not allow a taxpayer to use any method
that reflects income in a commercial accounting sense; it only specifies
that a method may not be used that does not clearly reflect income
for tax purposes.
Is there any accounting system that will defer income and still
meet the test of clear reflection of income?' What the Court will
hold if confronted with a system that accurately matches prepaid
receipts with subsequent expenses, thereby clearly reflecting income,
may very well be a moot question. Most service contracts obligate the
taxpayer to perform on the customer's demand, as in Schlude; 4 few
of these contracts obligate their sellers to perform only at fixed times
in the future. The most notable exception, the publishing houses, is
covered by section 455. Additionally, even if a taxpayer could corre-
late income and expenses, the Court probably would not allow de-
ferral because of the claim of right doctrine. 5 As stated in Schlude,
it is the contract, not the giving of the service, that fixes the tax-
payer's right to the prepaid receipts.'
Further, any system deferring income on a basis of statistical esti-
mates has been explicitly struck down by American Auto. Ass'n.' 7
Hybrid systems-using a cash basis for prepaid income and an accrual
basis for all other items-probably will not be allowed. Section
446(c) (4) allows combinations of cash and accrual methods, but all
accounting systems are subject to the "clear reflection of income"
requirement of section 446(b). For some time, there has been a gen-
eral rule that taxpayers cannot report income on one accounting
system and adjustments of that income on another system because
such computations distort income.' If, for example, a taxpayer like
Schlude were allowed a cash system for income and an accrual system
for deductions, his first year's return would reflect an unrealistically
'o' Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 446(b).
10. It is interesting to note that the Court's emphasis in the three recent cases, Automobile
Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957), American Auto. Ass'n v. United States,
367 U.S. 687 (1961), and Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963), was on the arti-
ficiality of the accounting systems.
'04372 U.S. at 135-36.
05 See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
"o 372 U.S. at 130.
'0' 367 U.S. at 693. Reserve funds based on statistical estimates are also forbidden.
In Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp. v. Commissioner, 293 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1961),
the court held that, in light of American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, the taxpayer could
not deduct its estimated liability for unsettled torts claims.
... United States v. Andrews, 269 U.S. 422, 440 (1926).
[Vol. 17
COMMENTS
high income because unearned receipts would be reported without
any deductions for the future costs of earning those receipts. In a
year in which current expenditures were low because relatively fewer
advances were received in the preceding year, the result would be
an inflated gross income for the current year. Further, if the tax-
payer decided to go out of business, he would have an unrealistic loss
to report in his final year of doing business. He would have no ad-
vances to report and still would have to incur expenses in fulfilling
the contracts executed in previous years. Because of the obvious dis-
tortions in net income that would result, it is doubtful that the Com-
missioner would allow such a hybrid accounting system.09
Two alternatives seem to remain open to the taxpayer. He can
abandon the accrual system altogether-hardly an acceptable solu-
tion---or he can, in effect, defer prepaid income by using a reserve
fund. Even though section 462, which specifically allowed the deduc-
tion of such reserves, was repealed, the repeal carried no inference of
disapproval df prior court decisions.' As was pointed out above,
some of the appellate courts have been amenable to the use of re-
serve funds."'
Aside from using reserves to allocate prepaid income over sub-
sequent tax periods, there is nothing the taxpayer can do unless there
is new legislation. The entire weight of judicial precedent is, of course,
against allowing deferrals.1" The courts will not, and should not,
make whatever changes need to be made. For nine years, Congress
has been struggling with this problem, and it still refuses to make
the deferral privilege available generally.'1 ' Allowing deferrals and
reserves once produced a great potential loss to the Treasury."' Con-
gress must weigh this impending loss of revenue against the fact that
many taxpayers employ the deferral practice as an integral part of
their accrual systems. If the deferral privilege were abolished, a tax-
payer would be denied his accrual system altogether."'
Ultimately, the decision to allow or to deny millions of taxpayers
the use of the accrual method should be a policy decision, not a
matter of judicial decision. The financial power of the nation is,
after all, vested in Congress."' Rather than leaving the courts to
' 9 American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 714 (1961).
110 See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
".. See note 32 supra.
112 See note 2 supra.
113 See notes 39-48 supra and accompanying text.
114 See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
... See notes 108, 109 supra and accompanying text.
1' U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
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decide prepaid income cases on the basis of concepts founded years
ago, when accrual accounting and prepaid receipts were not so vital
a part of the nation's business as they are today, Congress should
establish some new rules. Until it does so, the courts can decide cases
like Schlude in only one way-against deferral.
